Refolutionary Inflectional Zones of Democracy: Rethinking Post-civil Society Resistance

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The present excursus examines the radical roles of non-normative stake holders in the deepening of democracy in India. It looks for the irruption of otherness into the mundane hustle and bustle of mainstream Indian democratic politics, an otherness that constantly interrogates how democratic is our much trumpeted democracy. Slavoj Zizek and Alain Badiou aptly described the current version of liberal democracy as “capital-parliamentarism” that rules out the possibility of accommodating norm-deviant political agencies for greater radical political possibilities. Political practices in India largely remain loyal to the ideology of the vertical that disseminate the discourse of statism and social status quo and in this paper we attempt a study of horizontal paradigms of politics that breaks away from statist discourses of political normativism. In doing this we cite the case of West Bengal, a state that in 2011 witnessed historic regime change or „Poriborton“. The phenomenal political shift in that election, we argue, was possible through the participation of multiple non-civil society organizations and outfits such as the Maoists, human rights
groups and other subaltern resistive bodies. It witnessed a rainbow coalition of dissent consisting of traditional oppositional parties along with the said norm-deviant groups, groups that foregrounded in the public domain issues of redistribution, discrimination, state absolutism, etc with greater radicality. Differently put, these groups (many of which were banned organizations) radicalized the electoral fray firstly by bringing in neglected political-economy questions and also by openly fielding candidates whom they felt would make a difference. Such radical coalitions augur well for the health of the body politic because we believe they foreground a form of prefigurative and embryonic grammar of new politics that has a polygenetic nature of origin or that arise out of a pluriverse of political stake holders many of whom transcend the norms of rigid constitutionalism for a better future of the masses. If the liberal democratic model has ended up becoming a plutocratic ensemble of banks, corporate sector and state control, then real democratic cravings must strive for insurrectionary articulations – phenomena that emerge as radical agent provocateurs or precursors of real People’s Assembly. Recent works such as Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today: The Biopolitics of the Multitude Versus the Hegemony of the People and also in the work, Occupying Political Science: The Occupy Wall Street Movement from New York to the World (Welty, et al. 2013) point towards a journey of new political immanence that foresees a new methodology of non-traditional politics of participatory and vigilant format of democracy which transcends the confinements of civil society oriented political overtures. Such a scenario redefines the univalence of democratic politics governed by statist elitism and moneyed urbanism through the multivalence of dispersed and clustered forms of political assemblage. In other words, we are rallying for a diffused, de-gentrified, affinity based prefigurative political imaginary that can offer some alternatives to existing norms of bounded definitions of democracy. Here we incorporate the trajectories of global theoretic impatience with liberal democracy as expressed in works such as The Haterd of
Democracy (2006) by Jacques Ranciere and also in the recent theoretic works of Slavoj Zizek and Alain Badiou. Across the globe dissidence and resentment against the collusive nature of liberal democracy have given rise to the quest for new political alignments and new political arithmatic and in this paper we advocate such new alignments and equivalences in the Indian political scenario. As stated earlier, we take the recent political changes in West Bengal as our empirical base to argue for new theoretic and practical openings. In West Bengal in the Singur and Nandigram agitations anarchists, ultra leftists, civil society groups and mainstream political forces forged a unique coalition to constitute a resisting plank against the ruling Left Front’s economic policy of forceful eviction of farmers from their own lands. On the face of it such affinity among total strangers may appear absolutely intriguing and opportunistic but if we delve deep we can come up with new political forms of mobilization and radicality. Participations of these outfits along with traditional parliamentary parties in galvanizing mass discontent proved the efficacy of the combinatory postures of infusing radical practices with constitutional norms. As a result, what emerged were the creations of new inflectional zones of Indian democracy, zones where traditional and norm-deviant forces inflected each other for the greater good of democracy, aligning parliamentary reforms with radical quasi-revolutionary inflections, resulting in resolutionary (reform & revolution) paradigms. However, post-election, the new Trinamool government changed its stance and distanced itself from all radical outfits, thereby proving once again that democracy in its present bourgeois and statist avatar appropriates any space of dissent that goes beyond the civil discourse. With the death of Maoist leader Kishenji, the relative peace in Jangalmahal was made into a major political plank for TMC. We argue that this change in the policy of TMC hollowed out the historic possibility of radical democracy that could enfold traditional trajectories with non-normative forces of democracy or to extend it further, it betrayed a significant lesson showing the fallacies of civil society-centered resistances which tend to shy
away from all radicalities. With coercive governmentality apparatuses and the complete convergence between civil society and the state machinery, radical and bourgeois democratic processes are not in a position to arrive at a dialogic process for transformative change. Drawing on the works of Ajay Gudavarthy and Partha Chatterjee, etc., we would examine how parliamentary democracy in the global south can accommodate or negotiate with the radical forces to enable its own reformulation. This paper therefore argues for this dialogic interaction between statist and non-statist forces to continue for the greater good of democracy in this part of the world. While prescribing for such a path we are not resorting to any partisan way of endorsing one particular form of political imaginary, ours would simply be a case of arguing for a more flexible and accommodative form of democratic politics that does not shy away from engaging with all stakeholders. In what follows we would first discuss the notion of resolutionary zones or inflexional zones of Indian politics as practiced by many non-statist political outfits and then in the penultimate part we would come up with a study of recent political changes in West Bengal to substantiate the theoretic claims of resolutionary forces.

**Things fall Apart and the Crisis in Civil Society: Thinking Politics beyond Civil Spaces**

Ajay Gudavarthy in his *Politics of Post-Civil Society: Contemporary History of Political Movements in India* charts out the new political terrain that contemporary political movements in India are forging. In doing that he questions and seeks to go beyond the political vocabulary offered by civil society as this new political paradigm is basically of post-civil society in nature. But what necessitates this this thinking beyond the civil society paradigm? It is the failure of civil means to further democratic politics, „the impossibility of negotiating structured power relations„of the rulers over the governed, of capital over workers, of various social hierarchies, including those of caste and gender-within the limits and through the kind of practices,
institutions and ideals that civil society privileges” (p3). For example, the simultaneity of the secular/universal project of citizenship as well celebration of ascriptive/cultural identities creates only “movement without dignity” for the Dalit movement and thereby forcing it to exclusivist claims of authenticity and essentialised identity politics and settling only for recognition as against recognition and redistribution. Identity politics thus de-historicises the Dalit identity and naturalises it. This happens because of two inter-related and mutually complementary processes:

1. The intersection between the different practices of civil society that reproduces the power structure, and

2. The convergence between the state, market and civil society which otherwise look autonomous. This triumvirate obviates and precludes the possibility of radical transformative politics for the political movements.

Gudavarthy illustrates how the twin processes— the intersection of constitutive ambiguities of civil society and the convergence between state, market and civil society - buffer and weaken the radical democratic politics by his in-depth discussion of the trajectory of five contemporary socio-political movements of India- Human Rights Movement, Feminist struggle, Naxalite movement, Dalit movement and collectivities against pollution in an industrial town. In doing this he primarily, but not exclusively, focuses on the unfolding of these movements in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh and traces their lineage— their interaction with the means of democratisation civil society offers, the limitations civic modes of politics impose on them and how they ultimately come out of the fold of civil society.

How, then, the emergent post-civil society politics is moving beyond the logic of circularity of civil society? Gudavarthy thinks that the moment of arrest in the ‘logic of circularity’ is also an opportunity as the political movements ‘gain the capacity to comprehend the nature of the limits imposed, and
convert them into a resource to raise new questions- the art of critiquing the critique’ (p224). Thus, the moment of getting caught in the circularity logic is also a moment of learning-gaining insight about the constitutive nature of the ambiguities of civil society in reinstating the power dynamics- and of new impulse to move beyond this. The moment of identity politics in Dalit movement also led to powerful sub-caste movement that gave birth to „political identities beyond identity politics” (P225). There emerged the question of class within caste groups and re-alignment of caste-class issue. There was also self critique as the sub-castes were not only talking about themselves; they also recognised those castes below them. Thus, self critique led to new solidarity for the larger fight ie resisting the subjugation of the Dalits. Thus, self critique co-exists with conflict and resistance. The anti-liquor movement, too, moved the feminist struggle out of its singular focus on legality and differential identity politics to combine law with street politics. From Gudavarthy’s analysis three complementary aspects of post civil society politics can be put forward-

1. Combinatory and coalitionary postures of the political movements while retaining their separate identity,

2. Self critique,

3. Refolutionary means of transformation.

The transformative strategy of post-civil society politics goes beyond the either/or binary mode of civil society- where it is either in accordance with the legal constitutional mode that the state allows or it is in opposition to the state. They, individually and collectively, have combined multiple strategies. As Gudavarthy writes-
tyranny of the binary opposition. These combinatory or what we might refer to as revolutionary (‘ref’orm and rev’olution) processes have emerged as the new modalities and basis for the politics of post-civil society (p.230).

This re-signification of the available institutional practices compliments the militant modes of protest. As for example Gudavarthy talks about the human rights movements. It re-signified the meaning of ‘rule of law’ not only to curb state repression-to compel it to work within the limits of law- but also to contextualise the use of „political violence” by the militant groups, to transform the concept of justice to mean not only formal justice- equality before law – but also substantive justice.

The „paradoxical mode” of „resolutionary” strategy creates the „emancipatory collectives” to resist and transform oppression in varied and insidious forms. Revolutionary means may be one way to fight oppression but not the only one and must combine with other strategies to form truly liberated society. And this strategy needs the coalitionary approach and move. Political movements, thus, come together to act in unison forming the agency of inter-subjectivity. This new political subject may remind us of Negrian „multituide” or „common” with various differentiated actors. However, whereas the different actors „spontaneously” converge in Negrian emancipatory subject-the Multitude, the subject of post-civil society politics comes into being from „inter-subjective communication” marked by „materiality of mediations”. Gudavarthy writes-

such mediations are continuous and occur ‘within’ a movement-between its different segments-and between different political movements. It marks the moment when the agenda, strategies and modes of mobilisations are mutually borrowed and fused with their ‘own’ idea of transformation (p.234).

The political movements thus „work in unison as much as in their differentiation” (p234). The movements are „distinct”, but by learning from each other and from self critique of their
internal hierarchies they „continuously mutate” which becomes „constitutive of their self re-presentation” (p234). Under the impact of Naxalite movement the Dalit movement learns to re-align caste-class approach, whereas the feminist and caste issues mutates and re-invigorates the radical ideology of the Naxalites. The self-critique within the political movements also does not weaken the movement. On the contrary it consolidates the solidarity by addressing internal hierarchies. These „visible practices, yet non-events” lead to the „interstitial transformations” for building a radically democratic society and the „new actors” formed of the „inter-subjective dialogue” between political movements are the agents of change in a post-civil society politics.

Mapping the Post-Civil Society Politics in Contemporary West Bengal

The above exploration of Gudavarthy”s recent works therefore brings home roughly two significant points that can help us develop our argument. First, Gudavarthy is identifying a new churning in the Indian democracy with new entrants like Maoist and ultra left outfits that have brought in a whole gamut of questions which are so substantive and prolific that if adopted, the whole modality of conducting and practicing democracy is sure get transformed and radicalised. Secondly, with participations in election these outfits have themselves undergone restructuring in terms of doing away with ideological conservatism, ensuring more democratic mode of organising party structure and the accommodation of non-class issues like gender and ethnic rights. Therefore what is made crystal clear is that a new synergy in forms of experimentation, mediation and inter-penetration between parties, ideologies, popular demands have curved a new space in an otherwise simulated and ritualised rites of Indian democracy. But the contention is that these spaces are getting subduced by moral and cultural abstractions that are routinely demonstrated in the popular languages of parliamentary democracy. Consequently, fundamental issues like social justice, land reforms, distribution

Refolutionary Inflectional Zones of Democracy: Rethinking Post-civil Society Resistance

8 of 18
of wealth are shoved aside as being retrogressive and anti-
developmentalist, and ethnic demands have been looked down
upon as reflections of community narcissism, therefore narrow
and non-progressive. This „improbable democracy‟, to quote
Ashutosh Varshney‟s phrase, has congealed and discursified
the space of political to such an extent that any attempts for
mediation or interaction with forces that are marked as anti-
State are termed as seditious, non-patriotic. Binayak Sen or
Arundhati Roy‟s harassment in the hands of state machinery
can well be the referential point to corroborate the argument.
One can even argue what has made this democracy so
(im)probable is the way excess of violence and lawlessness has
been legitimised by the state and an imagined perception of
crisis has been demonstrated to reassert the validity of the
present form of democracy. In doing that it has rendered all
oppositional and alternative imaginaries of political obsolete
and foreclosed. Ajay Gudavarthy in an another book titled,
“Maoism Democracy and Globalisation” has made this point
explicitly:

the „crisis‟ of legitimacy understood in terms of democratic practices is seen
as a modality- a precondition- through which absolutism is actualised.
This is somewhat akin to capitalism today, which expands not bereft of
crisis- in growth and development- but precisely because of crisis. It is the
crisis that compels us, not to resist but hold on to the system to survive,
because we need to survive to protest. (Gudavarthy, 2014, p.47)

Therefore this paper on the contrary contends that if the
democracy has to be inclusive and responsive, these
oppositional forces need to be critically engaged with and
heeded upon to keep the possibility of an alternative open.
This possibility is not necessarily, therefore only, to be
imagined in the rhetoric of a venir, or a democracy to come,
rather this possibility has to be informed by the materialist
teleology in which battles of a different kinds are raging right
now between dispossessed, displaced, disempowered villagers
and the multinational corporate backed by the (post)colonial
state who are grabbing lands for the „theatre of infrastructure‟,
an infrastructure sans basic requirements for home, food and water for the common mass. Hence the paper wants to argue that whatever spaces of negotiation and interactions that have evolved following the Maoist insurgency in certain zones need to be sustained to radicalise and substantialize democratic institutions. In the case of West Bengal, Malinin Bhattacharya’s essay, titled as, “The Lalgarh Story” (Lalgarh is the place where the Maoist insurgency consolidated the most in Bengal) made this point that the story of Maoist insurgency in Lalgarh is much more diversified and layered than what it is made out to appear in the Statist narratives of governmental lapses and very reversely in the radical literatures that glorify them as new crusaders. She has shown how issues of linguistic identity, community rights, cultural heritage, which are often not addressed within the welfare and developmentalist discourses, informed their political understanding. The problem of the Jungalmahal is not solely about paucities of developmental initiative, it entails a whole lot of issues that range from a separate and distinguished definition of rights and collectivity which entails a distinct cultural question of identity and belonging. Though Bhattacharya has shown how the Maoist politics is falling short in properly articulating these grievances and is not free from accusations of torture and high-handedness, there is no gainsaying in the fact that it is because of their armed intervention, several questions of recognition and deprivation have surfaced and caught the popular imagination. Maoist politics in the face of these non-class issues of discrimination and deprivation also has to engage with these new emergent concerns as well. Gudavarth’s observation in this context is extremely pertinent, as he says,

*The ideas for new mostly lie in the old. It is not merely by demolishing them that one learns but by arduously working through the labyrinthine terrain. Every detail needs attention, care and even respect because the target of revolution is also the site for revolutionary politics...merely bombarding institutions and the legitimacy of institutionalised practices might end up destroying the site, and not the target. (ibid, p.62)*

Refolutionary Inflectional Zones of Democracy: Rethinking Post-civil Society Resistance

10 of 18
For new radical politics to open up, these new sites, agencies and new imaginaries are extremely significant (Saul, 2006, p.1-7). The Maoist politics in balancing the class question with other set of issues like the identity and representation has exactly enframed that possibility of the new radical opening. This paper wants to argue how that new radical opening emerged in the Bengal polity in the aftermath of the Singur-Nandigram-Lalgarh movements that created history by defeating the ruling Left-coalition of parties that were in power for over three long decades. This was the kind of defeat that immediately hogged the limelight of all critical attention across the globe. The Left coalitional govt. was the longest democratically elected dispensation in the world. It caused a huge ripple among social scientists, historians, sociologist who indulged in deconstructing the event, in understanding how that colossal victory was made possible and how that left“s formidable party organisation literally crippled before the Trinamool Congress (TMC)-Congress (INC) and Socialist Unity Center of India (SUCI) combine. To take that investigative quest further, this paper intends to argue how the radical roles of non-normative stake holders facilitated the historic regime change or Poriborton, as it is popularly couched in the Bengali dialect. The phenomenal political shift in that election, we argue, was possible through the participation of multiple non-civil society organizations and outfits such as the Maoists, lower caste communities, refuges, tribal and ethnic groups, human rights groups and other subaltern resistive bodies. It witnessed an unprecedented formation of dissenting blocs comprised of heterodox of ideas and political affiliations. What we witnessed can also be linked to what Gramsci calls ‘war of positions’ to bring down the repressive left regime in the state. As a consequence, these groups (many of which were banned organizations) radicalized the electoral fray firstly by bringing in neglected political-economy questions and also by persuading rightist forces to tinker with their ideological bases and raise issues which traditionally left parties have been pitching for. In the Singur-
Nandigram-Lalgarh agitations, participations of these outfits along with traditional parliamentary parties in galvanizing mass discontent proved the efficacy of the combinatory postures of infusing radical practices with constitutional norms. Monobina Gupta in a book on Mamata Banerjee, then opposition leader and now the Chief Minister of the state of West Bengal, titled, *Didi: A Political Biography* made this observation-

*Amid the churnings, Mamata gained some unexpected allies, many of them from the leftist political stream. Sections of the Marxist-Leninist factions in the state were one such group. ...Mamata’s association with Marxist-Leninist parties, inconceivable even a few years ago, firmed up during 2006-09”* (Gupta, 2012)

And-

*All three movements-Singur, Nandigram and Lalgarh- were born outside the pale of formal party structure. Their diversity accommodated groups that may not have been in agreement about strategies of protest and resistance. (Ibid)*

As a result, what emerged were the creations of new inflectional zones of Indian democracy, zones where traditional and norm-deviant forces inflected each other for the greater good of democracy, aligning parliamentary reforms with radical quasi-revolutionary inflections, resulting in *refolutionary* (reform & revolution) paradigms. Purnendu Bose and Dola Roy who were known for their leftist leanings joined TMC and Mr. Bose later joined the newly formed ministry. Pradip Banerjee another important leftist figure campaigned for the party during the poll, whereas several noted intellectuals and ultra leftist-sympathisers vigorously canvassed for the party in local and assembly elections. These formations at the grassroots configured what we can call ‘inflectional zones’ where diverse and differential demands for justice and rights comingle and cross fertilize each other. Nandigram and Lalgarh from this perspective may well appear as cradle for those combinatory postures that ironically brought down the leftist dispensation to reassert a more liberalised and broad
spectrum of left-of-the-center kind of politics. Sumanta Banerjee in an article, “Beyond the Debacle” written in the backdrop of that historic defeat, urged the parliamentary mainstream left to engage with such new combinatory postures that are critical of the neo-liberalist model of development. He reminds the mainstream left that this defeat need not be seen as a sign of the end of the left in India. The CPI(M) is not the sole repository of the leftist cause. There are other movements led by a variety of groups and organisations (not tied to the CPI (M), or any such political party) which are anchored more steadfastly in the values of social justice and equitable distribution of resources. It is clear from this observation that the new politics of critique as against the “neo-liberal political”, the words used by Gudavarthy, cannot limit itself to conventional party outfits. It is high time that the “frames of war” (Butler, 2009) in which the politics of Maoism is often reduced to, is abandoned to explore new agents of alternative radical politics.

What ails these Revolutionary Zones? Rethinking the Governmentality Question in the Politics of Post Civil Society:

In his critique of Partha Chatterjee’s formulation of political society (Gudavarthy, 2013b, p.1-28), Gudavarthy mainly objected that this mode of politics is basically misreading the subaltern resistance as an assertion of agency. On the contrary, what has driven those subaltern resistances is their utter helplessness, or to exactly use Gudavarthy’s phrase, “survival strategy”. Therefore, in the politics of post civil society, he has placed the question of subaltern agency on those unspecified interstices of intersectional politics that would emanate in those territorialities of inflectional zones. The subalterns in Gudavarthy’s formulations are those intersectional actors emerged out of conflicts and diverse pulls of differential ideologies. Now the question is whether those interactions between dalit, gender and class politics can at all take place in a power-neutral, non-hierarchic level-playing field? Gudavarthy himself avers that such neutral spaces are virtually non-
existing, but he did not adequately theorise the actual workings of governmentality discourses and how its hegemonic practices can possibly appropriate those enclaves of radical affiliations to suppress all its revolutionary content by turning those subaltern groups into beneficiaries of govt. doles and free sops. This is exactly what has happened in Bengal’s polity following the massive victory for TMC in 2011. Post-election, the new TMC government changed its stance and distanced itself from all radical outfits, thereby proving once again that democracy in its present bourgeois and statist avatar appropriates any space of dissent that challenges the very edifice of power which it represents. With the death of Maoist leader Kishenji, and the arrest of all major leaders of CPI (Maoist) the relative peace in Jangalmahal was made into a major political plank for TMC. This change in the policy of TMC not just ensured further uninterrupted operation of surveillance and control through governmental development programs, it hollowed out the historic possibility of radical democracy that could enfold traditional trajectories with non-normative forces of democracy. To put in different way, it betrayed a significant lesson on how governmentality paradigms allow certain modes of politics while snuff out the rest. Sustenance of radical politics within a bourgeois-democratic framework will depend on what kind issues it raises and how far it negotiates with the whole circuit of governmentality apparatuses. This circuit will on the opposite exhaust those radical edges that can threaten the very legitimacy of neo-colonial power constellations. To put it more clearly, governmentality machineries are determining which movement can proliferate and which cannot. A comparison of the Jadavpur Student’s agitation with the Lalgarh movements can best display which and what factors work for the former and lag in the later. Post-civil society politics has to take into cognizance these wider networks of modern power that not just assuage muzzles any movement or gives out doles to divert and appropriate any space of dissent, it even responds to one kind of movement to
scuttle out another to essentially create the post-political milieu.

**Conclusion**

With extensive and patronage-like governmentality apparatuses and the complete convergence between civil society and the dominant party politics in West Bengal, radical and bourgeois democratic processes are not in a position to arrive at a dialogic process for transformative change. For many Singur-Nandigram-Lalgarh triumvirate sparked a new politics of hope. Some even called those three movements as expression of „audacity of hope“. But these „hopes“, „revolutionary zones“ were deliberately jeopardised. APDR, Human Rights Commission, Women”s Rights Commission are virtually reduced to non-entity in the state. Discontents among the Gorkhaland, Kamtapur and Matua communities which supported TMC in the assembly election have in recent past resurfaced. All these developments collectively betray how the parliamentary politics and the associative enchantments of state and power can congeal the bourgeois democratic bedrock to the extent that it excludes all possibilities of alternative. On November 24th, 2011, just few months after TMC”s arrival in power, all media houses in Bengal and outside reported that Mallojula Koteswar Rao, alias Kishenji was killed in an encounter in the Burisol forest in the district of Paschim Medinipur. However, the press release of Abhay, the spokesperson of the CPI (Maoist) claimed that Kishenji was killed „after capturing him alive in a well planned conspiracy“. In fact there are enough grounds to doubt whether the encounter really took place or was it orchestrated to cushion off possible instances of excess of violation committed by the State. There are number of unanswered questions and dubious details regarding the exact condition that led to that alleged murder. But it can be said for sure that with that incident, the entire possibility that erupted through the „politics of otherness“ was nipped in the bud. We can end this article with these words of Bernard D”Mello in Monthly Review-
Kishenji erred in handling the contradictions between the CPI (M), then the ruling party, and the Trinamool Congress (TMC), led by Mamata Banerjee, then the main opposition party. And, his aggressive sectarian and ultra-left adventurist tactics cost the Party and the mass movement dearly, for these acts brought on state repression a multiple of what it would have otherwise been. The contradictions between the Maoist revolutionaries and the social-democratic CPI (M) at the local level need not have been escalated to the point of becoming intensely antagonistic. And, some of the (excessive) killings -- were the Maoists really annihilating class enemies? Ultimately, it was the Trinamool Congress who took advantage of the situation to defeat the CPI (M) candidates in the area in the assembly elections in April-May this year.

As part of her promise of ushering in parivartan (change), Mamata Banerjee pledged the withdrawal of the JF that, for the adivasis, has been an occupying force since mid-June 2009, the unconditional release of all political prisoners, especially the hundreds of adivasis arrested and dumped into jail in the course of the JF operations, and a dialogue with the Maoists; but, on assuming power, she has now reneged on all of these pledges. Instead, the recruitment of some 10,000 special police havildars (constables), on the lines of the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh, is on the anvil. And, the TMC's own Bhairav Bahini has been assisting the JF just like the CPI (M)'s harmads did as collaborators of that occupational force. Indeed, many of the harmads have shifted allegiance to the TMC's Bhairav Babini. A "development package" with "surrender" sops, the re-deployment of the JF with the Commando Battalions for Resolute Action, the so-called COBRA, at its core, the stepping up of training of the state's armed police in jungle warfare, a strengthening of the Naxalite section of the Intelligence Bureau on the lines of the Special Intelligence Bureau of Andhra Pradesh (APSIB), and the state's Counter Insurgency Force along the lines of the Greyhounds, all these are seen to have yielded results -- a mood of triumphalism now prevails after the "hunting" down of Kishenji. (D’Mello, 2015)
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