Ghosts of Indian Unity: Difference, Diversity, and Violence

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Abstract: Circumscribing appropriate dissent against the Centre’s politics through emergency legislation, politics of shaming, and violence is an integral part of the Indian state’s definition of Indian unity, and is directly related to the way that unity and diversity were defined during the anti-colonial campaigns of the 1940s. Conflation of ‘national unity’ with fundamental homogeneity has led to the portrayal of those non-normative Indians who sought to speak and organise from their position of difference, whether it be religious, communal, linguistic, or gendered difference, as disruptive to Indian unity and threatening to the state. Even when relatively complying minority citizens have often found themselves to be targets of improvement campaigns, loyalty pledges, and active silencing; while dissenting, or at times even visible, minority citizens have routinely been marked as anti-national. This paper traces the link between outbursts of violence against minority and marginalised citizens in the contemporary period and the definition of unity propagated through the anti-colonial movement of the 1930s and 40s. Focusing on three issues, the analysis and arguments around the Communal Violence Bill at the 2011 National Integration Council meeting, the reading of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in the wake of death of a young man from Arunachal Pradesh in 2014, and the 2016 jailing of student leader Kanhaiya Kumar, the paper argues that the adoption of majoritarian ideas of unity has continued to police the limits of what the state deems ‘legitimate diversity.’

Keywords: unity, democracy, minority, AFSPA, Kanhaiya Kumar, Communal Violence Bill, National Integration Council, anti-national

Inscribing Difference into the State

In the first few days of the Constituent Assembly in late 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru presented a resolution meant to define the ideological purpose as the creation of “an independent, sovereign republic” (Constituent Assembly Debates v1, 5). During the debate on this foundational resolution, S. Nagappa, a Congress representative from Madras and the convener of the Scheduled Castes members, used his speaking time to emphasise that the democracy would be successful only if it dealt adequately with Dalits, Adivasis, and
regional minority populations (Constituent Assembly Debates v2, 1). In speaking about the potential for an inclusive democracy for Dalit and Adivasi people, Nagappa urged:

I claim that we are a political minority. We are a minority because we were not recognised all these days and we were not given our due share in the administration of the country, but that cannot be forever. You know, Sir, what has been our position. This Resolution gives us a scope and a chance and an opportunity to be equal, to feel like equals and take our due share in the administration of the country (Constituent Assembly Debates vol2, 1).

Nagappa’s speech focused on the structure of equality in terms of unity and minority; that is, Nagappa contended that there was a connection between state respect for Dalits as integral to the nation and the recognition of minority constituent as potential participants in the building of democracy.

The specificity of drawing attention to the reality of political minority was a necessary and telling statement in response to a bill designed to open discussions in the constituent assembly on the crafting of the Indian constitution. Nagappa inscribed into the inaugural debates about the Indian state the recognition of historical and potential future exclusions as well as the hopefulness of an ongoing commitment to democracy and unity if only it were differently defined. Nagappa also introduced a recognition of uncertainty into a resolution designed to begin the process of drafting the constitution, which was raised as an effort to quash ambiguity or uncertainty about the meaning of Indian democracy and unity. Unfortunately for Nagappa, the general response to his speech about the need for recognition of difference and dissent was no response at all (Constituent Assembly Debates v2, 5).

In his response to the constitutive resolution of the Constituent Assembly, Nagappa speaks to the active failure of majority politics in recognizing and engaging with non-normative Indian-ness as Indian. This purposeful failure has been and continues to be argued on the basis of an intrinsic idea of a singular, fundamental way of being Indian, and the illegitimacy of difference beyond diversity in the state. I argue that despite the national slogans of “unity in diversity; diversity in unity” many minority populations in India are seen by the state as dangerous to state cohesion, whose speech and lives are in need of strict, forceful, and occasionally violent policing (Gandhi 2000, 352).

During the 1940s and early 1950s, in the wake of independence and nationhood, India experienced a crisis of unity. Fearing that a potential Indian nation was unattainable and unsustainable without a clear and definable unifying factor, mainstream anticolonial actors, especially those associated with the Indian National Congress party, argued that there was a fundamental unity in India that would manifest itself once the nation emerged from colonial domination (Nehru 1938, 230-32). This claim of fundamental Indian unity was an important stance against the colonial power, but it also served to emphasise
the relative uniformity of the majority’s vision of India and a future Indian state structure (Devji 2014; Sarkar 2005, 275-76).

The conflation of ‘national unity’ with fundamental homogeneity has led to the portrayal of those minority citizens who sought to speak, organise, and critique the state from their position of minority, whether it be religious, caste, class, linguistic, or gendered difference, as disruptive to Indian unity and a threat to the state (Bourdieu 1989; Jain 2007). Passive minority citizens have often found themselves to be the targets of improvement campaigns, loyalty pledges, and active silencing; while dissenting, or sometimes even visible, minority citizens have routinely been marked as anti-national and subject to violence. Yet Indian minorities have consistently committed to Indian politics, both as dissenting voices and in an effort to participate in the state without giving in to the majority vision of minority (Skaria 2014, 343; Hasan 2009, 26). In response the state has time and again affirmed minority politics as a site of approveable violence – both symbolic and physical. Minority politics is often blamed for violence committed by minorities, against minorities, and state responsiveness (or lack thereof) in the wake of said violence. Focusing on three moments, the National Integration Council of 2011, the relationship between the Indian State and violence against people from the Northeast, and the 2016 jailing of student leader Kanhaiya Kumar, this paper argues that the adoption of majority concepts of Indian unity has continued to police the limits of the what the Indian state is willing to accept as ‘legitimate’ diversity, even as minority politics continues to make itself visible.

**Reading Minority and Unity**

Mainstream nationalistic articulations of Indian unity created a vision of Indian-ness that either failed to consider minority ideas of the nation, or failed to conceive of minorities in the national story. The scope of Indian nationalism’s history often started with Aryans, Sanskrit, and Vedic Hinduism and ended with British colonialism and contemporary India. In this vision, people living in the South speaking non-Sanskrit-derived languages, non-Hindus, and lower castes people simply did not fit in the Indian imagery. Still, the nationalist movement tried to include these outliers as part of the rhetoric of the Indian nation by arguing that India had “diversity in unity.” The problem was that the nationalist vision of unity was a conflation between a fundamental homogeneity, though admittedly overlaid by diversity, and the idea of unity (Pandey 2001, 154). Indeed this concept of a mocked-up unity and diversity claim is one that seems to be resonant throughout the postcolonial world, with many other postcolonial countries (Ethiopia, for example) using similar slogans (Smith 2013). Although at pains to deny it, in the Indian nationalist vision of the nation, minorities were Indians disguised as something else, but in the minority reading of these nationalist histories, minorities were “not-quite” Indians, defined as much by their poor fit into the national story as by their
commitment to the nation that story was supporting (Prasad 1997, 158). In a sense, minorities could only be defined as “the remainder” of the Indian nation: part of the nation, but outside the nation’s own mythos (Beverley 1998, 308).

Given the uncertain space of minority in Indian identity, a robust dissent from the fundamental unity of Indian identity was troublesome, and not merely because of strong inclinations toward non-national identities, but also because of the failure to account adequately for the majority’s own claims of inclusivity.

The narrative of prehistoric similarity and the penchant for inclusivity often started – as Nehru’s memoir of a nation, Discovery of India, does – by recognizing the diversity in Indian life (Nehru 2004). This recognition is a necessary beginning, because it places the colonial critique of Indian misadventure with unity within the claim to intrinsic unity. Yet the recognition of distinct-ness is often quickly subsumed within a narrative of sameness (James 2004, 140). Difference, then, functioned in one of two ways: either as a spice added to the stew, or as a scheme on the part of the colonial power to undermine India’s ability to function like a nation. Especially among historians from minority populations, the impetus to claim a unified history, particularly in the face of historical conflict, meant that difference had to manifest as diversity, and diversity had to manifest as trivial, and as something that could be overcome, as in the idea of gradual unity (Kabir 1955).

The result of the unifying of historical narrative for the purpose of the state was that irreconcilable difference became a perversion of the natural history of the state. Anyone who felt left out of the narrative was seen to be at fault for their own disengagement from the state. As B. R. Ambedkar claimed in his book Pakistan or the Partition of India, the sense of Indian cultural and historical unity was only a powerful inducement insofar as it readily engaged the population (Ambedkar 1946, 11-21; Renan 1990, 8-22). Thus Ambedkar argued that if the All India Muslim League persisted in demanding Pakistan, there was not a space for unity within India, because an India that included the Pakistan activists was not a possible event (Ambedkar 1946, 11-21). What did seem possible, for many of the minority and marginal organisations, whose difference was often denied by the majority-created histories of the Indian state, was a negotiated unity based on the very enlargement of Indian citizenship that Ambedkar implied, a unity for which the foundation was not similarity but commitment.

The concerns about Indian unity functioned as an effective rallying tool for anticolonial activists trying to create a more effective argument against British colonial rule. Congress and its allies argued that British policies (such as the census and land taxes), as well as British politics, encouraged religious and regional groups to organise separately and to negotiate with the government separately (Cohn 1996; Cohn 2001, 136-71). Congress pointed out that the British policies were enacted to define people by their differences, so that various groups would be less likely – even less able – to work together or see
each other as similarly Indian. These fissures allowed the British to continue to claim the intractable difference in India and would encourage a continuation of colonial rule there. Congress and other anticolonial activists often cited divide-and-rule tactics to describe communal and regional disputes. Implicitly, the argument made by anticolonial activists was that recognizing divide-and-rule tactics for what they were then allowed for “communities, interests, and political leaders” to set aside divisive colonial practices and affirm their commitment to Indian independence (Modern Review 1944, 95; Lorcin 1999).

Scholars have often recognised that nationalism constitutes exclusion and that this exclusion is often made in terms that are broadly recognised as “majority constitutive group” and “minority other.” This is certainly the most common way that Indian nationalism has been described. Focusing on contemporary (or historical) effusions of Hindu nationalism, scholars have pointed to the way that Indian-ness was prefaced on making the majority national (Pandey 2006, 89). National identity is therefore often defined as “majority identity,” expansively defined. This is as much the case in India as elsewhere, and the Indian citizen continues to be imagined as northern, light-skinned, male, and caste Hindu (Menon 2009). Still, this does not mean that men and women outside this picture were unable or uninterested in the project of building a nation that could include them more intimately. Minority attempts to create an Indian nation inclusive of minority identities were seen both in their rejection of the trite Indian unity and in the challenge to establish a democracy that was interested in unity defined by both minority and majority. Yet Indian independence did not automatically make minorities into normative citizens, and the affirmation of any serious consideration of difference as an internal throwback to colonial hegemony made rethinking unity as negotiated or democratic difficult. Some Indian nationalist organisations, and especially Congress, were unable to think about how unity could be defined in such a way as to allow difference to be fundamental; as a result, the “crisis of unity” continued as a national motif, and state unity, which could accommodate diversity but not difference committed the state to distrust and disapproval of minority and marginal citizens (Facets of Indian Unity 1965). In the next two sections, this paper considers how foundational state unity has narrowed spaces for political dissent and has defined as anti-national legitimate expressions of difference.

2011 National Integration Council: Minority and Violence

Despite the attempts to codify Indian democracy in such a way that references to dissent or advocacy for change were largely downplayed, nearly continual pushes for changes in regional organisation, power sharing, freedom of speech, and representation led to concern in the central government about national integrity. In 1961, during the height of the fight for linguistically organised states, enduring communal tensions, and regional independence movements,
Jawaharlal Nehru established an at-will body, the National Integration Council (NIC), that could be convened by the Centre to consider threats to national unity. The National Integration Council was charged with “review[ing] all matters pertaining to national integration, and to make recommendations thereon” (Ministry of Home Affairs, n.d.). Since its original inception more than fifty years ago, the NIC has met sixteen times, often after incidences of perceived state insecurity. It was instated after Indira Gandhi’s assassination and the retaliatory anti-Sikh riots in Delhi, as well as in response to the Ayodhya crisis and the subsequent riots in Mumbai.

In April 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reconstituted the National Integration Council, and a meeting took place in September 2011 (Kumar 2010). The NIC’s stated agenda was to think through mechanisms to investigate and intervene in issues of national unity and common governance, and specifically to speak to violence as it functioned in the state and against the state. Functionally the meeting took place under the shadow of two specific events, the first was a bombing in the Delhi high court reception area earlier in September 2011. The bombing was linked to Harkat ul Jihad al Islami (HUJI) and sparked inflammatory rhetoric about the acceptability of Islam as a religion and Muslims as Indian citizens (Zuck 2011; Pandey 2011). The second, and more premeditated, event was the parliamentary debate about the Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill, 2011, otherwise known as the Communal Violence Bill (PRS Legislative Research 2011). This bill, written by the National Advisory Council, in consultation with critics of the government’s approach to the prevention of communal violence, was meant in large part to hold public officials responsible for the failure to protect or respond to victims, and most often victims from minority populations, in the case of communal violence (Desai 2011, 12; Peer 2011, 146).

The Prime Minister’s speech opening the NIC was clearly focused not just on the regulation of law and order in the state, but also on the need to make order regular and responsive, gesturing to the unhappy but commonly true experience of excessive state violence in responding to protest and civil disobedience (NIC Proceedings 2011, 2-7). At the same time however, Singh’s speech argued, and Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram’s speech amplified, the importance of strong shows of state power in the face of violent opposition, echoing a call on the one hand to re-evaluate state power and responsibility in terrorism and communal violence and on the other to reinforce the deeply anti-inclusionary militarisation of specific Indian regions, including what Chidambaram cited as the “ideologically driven Left Wing Extremists and the recalcitrant separatists groups in the North-Eastern States” (NIC Proceedings 2011, 1-2).

The NIC meeting itself was attended by Ministers of Parliament, community advocates (especially those who were part of the National Advisory
Council), scholars, and other public figures (NIC proceedings 2011, 201). The debate focused heavily on the proposed Communal Violence Bill, but with the spectre of the recent bombing in the background. In general, the speeches responded to the bill from three positions. First, represented by Arun Jaitley among others, was the idea that the bill under consideration punished majority communities and put law and order at risk (NIC proceedings 2011, 9, 13, 25). He argued that minority rights were necessary, but not at the expense of law and order and the sanctity of the state. Moreover, he and other members using the NIC as a chance to argue against the Communal Violence Bill, suggested that bringing forward a bill meant to police public officials at a time when the state was shaken by a terrorist attack, was illegitimate and antinational.

The second, and least common of the arguments was that civil disturbance and violence against the state were fundamentally linked to a growth of inequality, lack of central development, and a general understanding by economic and social minorities that their lives were lived in, as Ela Bhatt argued, an “other State” from the prosperous India of state advertisements (NIC proceedings 2011, 47-48; Satyavrata 2004, 213). Several members of the NIC focused their attention on economic disparities as the reason for violence, especially violence against the state. This was especially strongly argued by people representing areas with large scheduled castes and tribes, especially in areas with significant naxal and separationist movements. The ‘rehabilitation’ argument held that more resources could induce minorities to put aside critiques of the nation. This argument, while useful, does assume that the claims of groups protesting Indian state violence are a tactic to secure more resources, and not a participatory gesture.

Finally, a large group of participants made the argument, in the words of Dr. John Dayal, that “the complicity of the state’s apparatus in communal violence has to be looked into. (NIC proceedings 2011, 46)” Among the participants who argued that a recognition of the state’s complicity in violence was necessary to responding to communal violence, several pointed to political and economic violence, including limiting access to fair labour laws, the denial of the right to civil disobedience in highly militarised areas, and the idea that the state’s responsibility to recognise minority citizens was a charity rather than a duty (NIC proceedings 2011, 33-34).

The Communal Violence Bill that was under consideration at the time was not a perfect bill, scholars on all sides of the issue criticised the ability of the bill to be enforced and the encroachment of the Centre on the powers of the states (Peer 2011, 147). Critics on the right, like Jaitley, argued that the bill demonised the majority as communal, while granting immunity to minorities who committed terror (NIC proceedings 2011, 26). More interestingly, scholars and public officials on the left pointed to the paternalistic language of rehabilitation and recompense for minorities in the bill (Desai 2011, 15). These complaints tied coherently to the arguments advanced about minority rights.
being entirely about welfare rather than recognition and participation, with families being granted money for the lose of loved ones in communal riots, but not the space to tell their story. Even more problematically, the bill set up procedures for public servants faced with a communal or terror related challenge drawn from emergency legislation like the Prevention of Terror Act, (2002) known as POTA (Desai 2011, 15). Yet as Mihir Desai argued, the bill made the claim that “there is an institutional and structural bias against the minority communities which plays out sharply especially during riots” (Desai 2011, 13).

It is appropriate that the National Integration Council was held under the dual shadow of the High Court bombing and the intense fighting over the Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill. The Communal Violence Bill itself, while being a starting point toward the recognition of minority citizen’s unequal share of state protection, also reemphasised the feeling that the state marked difference in the act of violence and its removal. The Communal Violence Bill was dropped by the government in February 2014, when it became perfectly clear that it would never pass (Prabhu 2014). The failure of the bill was seen as a win for majority rights and for supporting the power of the state to enforce an orderly India, and to quiet dissonant voices.

**Armed Democracy: Marginal Citizens, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, and Questioning Democratic Responsibility**

In January 2014, Nido Taniam, a student from Arunachal Pradesh visiting his sister in the Delhi, was beaten to death in the middle-class, south Delhi neighbourhood of Lajpat Nagar. According to news sources, the attack on Taniam was racially motivated, with the attackers using racial slurs toward him, notably calling him “Chinki” or in some reports the English word Chinese (Sitlhou 2014). Taniam’s death prompted mass protests over the harassment and danger that people from the northeast face when they travel to and live in what one activist called “mainland” India (Talukdar 2014). Yet, Taniam’s death was not an isolated incident; it was part of a pattern of racially motivated violence against people from the northeast on the basis of racial, ethnic, and linguistic differences (Indian Telegraph 2014).

Violence and harassment against people from northeastern states is especially fraught, because it is most often justified by reference to the “otherness” of the northeast in comparison to the “mainland” (International Business Times 2012). The northeast has been seen by the state as backward, antinational, and not able to integrate into “normal” Indian society, despite being simultaneously claimed as an integral part of India, a judgment that persists from colonial government assessments of the region (McDuie-Ra 2012, 35-44; Bora 2010). The ongoing separatist movements in many northeastern states, and their subsequent classification by the Indian government as
“disturbed,” as well as a perception of difference from normative Indian categories, have forced people from the northeast to consistently assert their Indian-ness to a sceptical majority, and to constantly claim their commitment to a dismissive state (Baruah 2014, Gaikwad 2009, 301). The characterisation of the northeast as dangerous and degenerate is not simply visible in the discourse about the region, but also codified in the extrajudicial management of much of the northeast by the centre, through highly militarised policing under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), ratified in 1958. The AFSPA – like its colonial predecessor, was made to ensure the structure of the state on local populations in areas defined as “disturbed” in the name of national security protocol, most prominently in the Northeast and to a lesser extent in Kashmir, for more than fifty years (Singh 2007, 97).

In 2013, Wajahat Habibullah, the chairman of the National Commission on Minorities – a government organisation set up for the protection of religious minorities in India – argued that the AFSPA was “against democracy and the constitution” (Hindustan Times 2013). Chairman Habibullah’s remarks were directed at the Verma Committee report, which also claimed that the AFSPA should be repealed or at least revised to allow for the government and its citizens to have legal recourse in cases of armed forces brutality, rape, or unwarranted arrest (Verma et al 2013). The Verma Committee had been charged with the task of identifying areas of Indian law and practice that could be improved upon in the wake of the broad failures of law and society after the 2012 Delhi gang rape. The recommendation to repeal the AFSPA notes the instances of alleged custodial rape by military forces in the northeast and Jammu and Kashmir that had been sheltered under the law (Verma et al 2013, 149-51). By including the repeal of the AFSPA in his recommendations, Justice Verma implied that the screening of perpetrators of rape by the state in regions covered by the AFSPA undermines the claim of equal justice, equal law, and equal stake in the Indian state. The Verma Committee report was a reiteration of the 2005 recommendations of Justice B. P. Jeevan Reddy that the act be dismantled, and that those provisions deemed absolutely necessary be included in other acts in order to provide more democratic oversight and accountability (Fernandes 2013; Noorani 2009, 8-11).

It is worth considering the AFSPA as a function of the constriction of acceptable visions of democracy and unity. In the midst of discussion about how and when a law like the AFSPA could or should be repealed, the two main considerations seem to be the ability to assimilate the population into “Indian” life through state mechanisms versus sovereignty and security needs of the state and its borders (The Tribune 2015). Activists are once again calling for an India that is willing to measure its unity and democracy not by the willingness to be similar, but by an acceptance of the commitment both to difference and to India. As activist Irom Sharmila has implored, “People see me as a separatist, but I am struggling for India’s integrity” (Roy 2014). While the
AFSPA and other permanent emergency legislation is often put forward as the limit of democracy or as a requirement for the security state, ultimately these kinds of laws make clear who democracy in India is for – normative Indians – and what kind of state it produces.

**Conclusion: Responding to State Unity**

In February 2016, Kanhaiya Kumar, the President of the Student Union at Jawaharlal Nehru University, along with two other student leaders, was arrested on charges of sedition based on his attendance at an event speaking about issues ranging from the death of Afzal Guru, the violence and hypermilitarisation in Kashmir, and Kashmiri self-determination. The event was critical of the state and after confrontation with protesters, some students, though notably not Kumar and other student leaders, began chanting slogans against Indian unity such as “Bharat ke tukde honge hazaar” (Jain 2016). After the event, Kumar was branded by the government as “anti-national,” with the Home Minister, Rajnath Singh, saying “If anyone raises anti-India slogans, tries to question the country’s unity and integrity, they will not be spared” (Pathak, Sunny and Sebastian 2016). The arrest of Kumar and others, after the event coincided with a large and intimidating police presence on JNU campus, and a rhetoric among government officials that JNU and the academic freedom of the university were in someway inherently anti-national. Kumar was violently beaten on the way to the court by lawyers, and was ultimately released after almost a month in jail (Siddiqui 2016; NDTV 2016).

While Kumar was in jail, students, faculty, and political activists from around India, and around the world, protested, spoke, and wrote about the narrowing of acceptable nationalism that would allow for violence in the name of protecting national unity and integrity, and name as sedition, legitimate protest against state sponsored violence (Banerjee 2016; Gulati 2016). In his speech after being released from jail, Kumar directly addressed the idea that dissenting from the state’s vision of India meant being anti-national by challenging the idea that nationalism only functioned in a way that revered the state (Kumar 2016; Mehta 2016, 322-3). Still, it is important to understand the JNU case as part of the state’s fundamental discomfort with a vision of unity that allows for sincerely argued dissent as part of national affiliation (Majumdar 2016, 312-314).

The JNU case, as with many other examples including the two that have been covered in greater detail here, presents a useful case to consider both government insistence on a majority idea of state unity and attempts to push back against the homogeneity that such a vision of unity represents. The attempt to constrain Indian unity to only recognise majority actors as legitimately and completely Indian and Indian difference as superficial, has foundations laid by colonial rule, built by the crisis of unity, strengthened to a panic by partition, and finally consolidated on the backs of minority
populations and dissenting citizens (Kaviraj 2010, 13-15). At the same time, the prospect of an ethical and inclusive Indian unity, built to accept dissent and difference, has always been part of many strains of politics, especially minority responses to the nation. Yet shaking the idea of an ethical and inclusive unity loose from its bonds to liberalism, individualism, and majority entailed more than a refining of procedures and policies, and more than a simplistic vision of national exceptionalism that built upon a rhetorical desire for equality.

The push among minorities attempting to define their role in national life was seen by the majority politics to exacerbate the crisis of unity, because attempts to carve out regional, religious, or linguistic identities as both Indian and separate from the well-established national imagination seemed to point to the ways that Indians felt different from each other rather than emphasizing a sense of national purpose. But for some minority politics, where minority is broadly defined to include caste, class, gender, religious, linguistic, and political minorities, participating in the Indian state while emphasizing their own constituency, defined the expansive potential for Indian unity.

Implicitly, the problem was that minority demands for a good-faith effort to include their voices in the negotiation of the national unity and Indian democracy around the time of independence was seen by the majority as undermining the majority story of fundamental equivalences in the needs and desires of the entirety of the Indian population drawn from the claims of real and fundamental unity and surface diversity. Indeed, the Indian National Congress’s claim of being able to represent everyone, including members of caste, class, and religious minorities, was largely based on the inadmissibility of Indian political difference. Hence when Jawaharlal Nehru argued that, “Whatever the shortcomings and errors of Congress might be it is in conception and even in practice a national movement … It is essential that there be such an organisation. There is no other,” he was claiming for Congress, and on the behalf of the majority, a right to police minority claims to national politics and practice, especially as they might challenge or dissent from stated Congress policies (Jinnah-Nehru Correspondence 1948).

The violence, physical, political, and social, in claiming the ability to define Indian state unity is almost entirely visited upon minority actors, and as has been argued throughout this paper, that violence is consistently justified on terms of fears of a failure of national integrity. It is also clear, that recent government actions have exacerbated but not invented the refusal to imagine minority dissent as a part of Indian national politics. Yet, it is also true that the will to engage and dissent against Indian state unity persists, and similarly traces itself roots back to the 1940s and 50s push to define democracy and unity for a future Indian state. Seeing the state unity violence as defined by and beholden to eighty or ninety years of panic about the potential for an Indian state does not justifies the damage of unity politics, but it does give those who would argue for an expansive Indian unity a place to begin making claims.

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Notes

1 Debate about Nehru’s resolution began on 13 December 1946. It is notable that Nagappa’s speech, which focused very specifically on the lack of inclusion and representation of Dalits and Adivasis began with a statement of active indifference about the lack of Muslim League representation in the Constituent Assembly, in response to a series of colleagues missing the members of the Muslim League.

2 Ambedkar was explicitly analyzing India’s claims to national coherence on the basis of Ernest Renan’s essay “What is a Nation,” toward the debate about the legitimacy of the All India Muslim League’s demands for Pakistan.

3 The NIC was notably not convened after the Gujarat riots.

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